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In 2011  the  National  Marine  Fisheries  Service  began  a  systematic  collection  of  performance  indicators  for
U.S. ﬁsheries  managed  under  catch  shares.  Catch  shares  are  a  ﬁshery  management  tool  that  dedicate  a
secure  share  of  quota  allowing  individual  ﬁshermen,  ﬁshing  cooperatives,  ﬁshing  communities,  or  other
entities  to harvest  a ﬁxed  amount  of  ﬁsh.  Catch  share  design  varies  widely  across  different  programs
and  regions.  Many  programs  share  similar  biological,  social,  and  economic  management  objectives  even
though  these  design  features  are  tailored  to  accommodate  particular  ﬁshery  characteristics.  This  paper
evaluates  ﬁsheries  using  standardized  indicators  to  measure  the  basic  economic  performance,  regard-
less  of  catch  share  program  design.  Data  collected  were used  to evaluate  the  economic  and  distribution
effects  of  U.S.  catch  share  programs.  Catch  share  ﬁshery  performance  is  compared  to  a baseline  period
prior  to  implementation  of  the  catch  share  program.  Overall,  the  majority  of objectives  to  improve  the
economic  performance  of  catch  share  ﬁsheries  were  achieved.  Catch  share  programs  have  been  effective
in reducing  ﬁshing  capacity.  However,  catch  share  programs  have  had  distributional  consequences  as
there  are  indications  that  consolidation  is occurring  in a number  of  programs.  For  example,  there  have
been  considerable  reductions  in the  number  of  active  vessels  and  entities  holding  quota  share  in  the
Alaska  Halibut  and  Sableﬁsh  and  the  Mid-Atlantic  Surfclam  and  Ocean  Quahog  catch  share  programs.
However,  it is  important  to note  that the  accumulation  of ownership  share  may  be less  of  a concern  than
consolidation  in  the  use  of  quota.  Thus,  to the  extent  that  consolidation  is considered  a  management
problem,  it may  be  more  effective  to  consider  caps  on the  use of  quota  than  by imposing  more  restrictive
ownership  caps.
Published  by Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license  (http://. Introduction
Catch share programs are management tools that dedicate a
ecure share of a quota, allowing individual ﬁshermen, ﬁshing
ooperatives, ﬁshing communities, or other entities to harvest a
xed amount of ﬁsh. These management tools are known as Limited
ccess Privilege Programs or Individual Fishing (or Transferable)
uota (IFQ/ITQ) Programs. The goals of these programs vary based
pon the individual needs of the associated ﬁshery, but generally
atch share programs are designed to reduce overcapacity, promote
afety at sea, and provide social and economic beneﬁts (Anderson
nd Holliday, 2007; National Research Council, 1999, p. 33). Catch
hare programs also include a number of biological goals (e.g.,
eduction in bycatch, adhering to annual catch limits, etc.). How-
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: ayeisha.brinson@noaa.gov (A.A. Brinson).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ﬁshres.2016.03.008
165-7836/Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-Ncreativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
ever, these biological goals would have been required in the United
States whether or not a catch share program was implemented as
they are required by the Reauthorized Magnuson Stevens Act (MSA,
2007). The performance of catch share programs relative to biolog-
ical goals has been evaluated in many studies, including Essington
et al. (2012). Our focus is on the social and economic performance
of catch share ﬁsheries.
Catch share management is not unique to the United States
as the management regime has been implemented in several
other countries. Some of the early adopters of ITQs include
The Netherlands (Salz, 1996), Iceland (Arnason, 2002, 2008;
Haraldsson, 2008), Canada (Dupont and Grafton, 2000; Marsden
and Sumaila, 2005), and Australia (Campbell et al., 2000; Grafton
and McIlgorm, 2009). Bonzon et al. (2013) estimated that catch
shares in one form or another have been implemented in 40 coun-
tries, covering over 900 species in about 200 programs. In the
United States, catch share management was ﬁrst introduced in the
surfclam and ocean quahog ﬁsheries in 1990 (Wang, 1995) then in
D license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Table  1
U.S. federal catch share programs, implementation year and respective Fishery Management Council.
Catch Share Program Name Year Council
Surfclam & Ocean Quahog ITQa,b 1990 Mid-Atlantic
Wreckﬁsh ITQa,c 1992 South Atlantic
Western Alaska Community Development Quotad 1992 North Paciﬁc
Alaska  Halibut & Sableﬁsh IFQa,b,e 1995 North Paciﬁc
American Fisheries Act (AFA) Pollock Cooperativese 1999 North Paciﬁc
Paciﬁc  Sableﬁsh Permit Stackingf 2001 Paciﬁc
Bering  Sea and Aleutian Islands (BSAI) Crab Rationalization 2005 North Paciﬁc
Red  Snapper IFQa 2007 Gulf of Mexico
Central Gulf of Alaska Rockﬁsh Cooperativese 2007 North Paciﬁc
Amendment 80 Non-Pollock Trawl Catcher/Processor Groundﬁsh Cooperatives 2008 North Paciﬁc
Golden Tileﬁsh IFQa 2009 Mid-Atlantic
General  Category Atlantic Sea Scallop IFQa 2010 New England
Northeast Multispecies Sectors 2010 New England
Grouper-Tileﬁsh IFQa 2010 Gulf of Mexico
Paciﬁc  Groundﬁsh Trawl Rationalization (Shoreside Whiting and Shoreside Non-whiting)b,e,g 2011 Paciﬁc
a Refers to Individual Transferable/Fishing Quota (ITQ/IFQ).
b The two components of the Program will be presented separately as singular ﬁsheries.
c Not included in forthcoming analyses due to conﬁdentiality issues.
d The Community Development Quota Program is a unique program with the goal of preserving Alaska Native and community involvement in Alaskan ﬁsheries. For this
reason, it is not included in the forthcoming analyses.
e These indicators only cover the harvesting sectors because the inclusion of the mothership or catcher-processor sectors would confuse comparison across all of the catch
share  programs.
f Paciﬁc sableﬁsh permit stacking was only partially implemented in 2001; data from 2002 represent the ﬁrst full year of the program and will be used as year 1 in the
forthcoming analyses.
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og The 2011 implementation of the Trawl Rationalization combines the non-whitin
ased  harvesters, catcher-processors and motherships. The shoreside whiting and 
ake.
he wreckﬁsh ﬁshery in 1992 (Gauvin et al., 1994) and in the Alaska
alibut and sableﬁsh ﬁsheries in 1995 (Hartley and Fina, 2001). Cit-
ng a number of concerns over the social and economic effects of IFQ
rograms, the U.S. Congress included a moratorium on the adoption
f any new IFQ programs with the passage of the 1996 reautho-
ization of the Magnuson Stevens Act. With this Act, the Ocean
tudies Board of the National Research Council was commissioned
o study the impacts of IFQs and make recommendations toward a
ational policy on the use of IFQs (National Research Council, 1999).
uring the moratorium, the Alaska Pollock Cooperatives were cre-
ted by the American Fisheries Act in 1998 and a program that
llowed the stacking of Paciﬁc sableﬁsh permits was developed in
000. The moratorium expired in 2000, but was extended through
 Congressional appropriations bill to 2002 with an exception that
llowed the implementation of the Paciﬁc Sableﬁsh Permit Stack-
ng Program to move forward. Nine additional catch share programs
ave been implemented since the moratorium was lifted in 2002
Table 1).
As with other management tools, there are both supporting
nd opposing arguments for managing ﬁsheries using catch shares.
hese differing viewpoints have been thoroughly reviewed by oth-
rs (see for example, Yandle and Dewees, 2008; Abbot et al., 2010),
hich we do not repeat in detail here. A sample of studies on
he economic beneﬁts or performance of individual catch share
sheries includes efﬁciency gains (Wang, 1995; Weninger, 1998),
roductivity (Felthoven et al., 2009; Walden et al., 2012), employ-
ent (Abbot et al., 2010), transferability (Criddle and Strong, 2013),
apacity (Felthoven, 2002), markets and prices (General Accounting
fﬁce, 1999; Herrmann, 1996; Lee, 2014), welfare analysis (Lee
nd Thunberg, 2013), and effects on processors (Matulich, 2008;
atulich and Clark, 2003). The negative effects, particularly those
f ITQs, include economic inefﬁciencies associated with highgrad-
ng (Anderson, 1994), excessive consolidation (Yandle and Dewees,
008) or changes in bargaining power due to vertical integration
Dawson, 2006). Other researchers have called for a comprehen-
ive review of the different dimensions of catch share ﬁsheries
o complete an impact assessment (Thébaud et al., 2012), while
thers have noted distributional consequences among individualshiting components of the ﬁshery. The whiting component has three sectors: shore-
side non-whiting components will be treated as separate ﬁsheries for comparison
(Bromley, 2009; Macinko, 2014) and communities following imple-
mentation of catch share programs (Carothers et al., 2010; Olson,
2011).
Typically, the social science literature comprises studies on the
evaluation of catch share program performance based upon expec-
tations from economic theory or social dislocations. In this paper,
we depart from this approach and evaluate catch share program
performance based on the stated goals, objectives and anticipated
impacts as they were articulated by the Fishery Management Coun-
cils, following Clay et al. (2014). The majority of social and economic
studies on catch share ﬁshery performance focus on speciﬁc pro-
grams with far fewer studies of multiple catch share programs using
a common set of metrics. Grafton and McIlgorm (2009) reviewed
seven Australian catch share programs using a mix  of quantita-
tive and qualitative criteria. More recently Grimm et al. (2012)
used publicly available data to evaluate 15 major U.S. and Cana-
dian catch share ﬁsheries. In this paper, we  build on Grimm et al.
(2012) for U.S. catch share programs by using a set of quantita-
tive indicators with more recent data. Additionally, we  apply these
indicators to U.S. catch share program subcomponents that were
not covered in Grimm et al. (2012) and we include recently imple-
mented programs. We  also provide updates to the catch share
indicators reported in Brinson and Thunberg (2013) as well as
recently completed estimates of multi-factor productivity (MFP)
change (a measure of changes in quantities of inputs used to harvest
ﬁsh and outputs produced) in U.S. catch shares ﬁsheries (Walden
et al., 2014).
2. Methods and data
We  depart from the approach of evaluating catch share program
performance based upon economic theory or social dislocation.
Instead we develop indicators based on the stated goals, objectives
and anticipated impacts as they were articulated by the Fishery
Management Councils at the time the programs were designed
and implemented (Clay et al., 2014). While there is considerable
variability in the stated objectives of all of the catch share pro-
grams, the interest here is on goals and objectives that are common
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Table  2
Common program goals, objectives, or expected impacts at the time a catch share program was  developed by Fishery Management Councils.
Goals/Objectives/Impacts Surfclam
&
Ocean
Quahog
Golden
Tileﬁsh
General
Cate-
gory
Scallop
Multispecies
Sectors
Red
Snap-
per
Grouper-
Tileﬁsh
Paciﬁc
Sable-
ﬁsh
Paciﬁc
Ground-
ﬁsh
Trawl
Rat.
Alaska
Halibut
&
Sable-
ﬁsh
AFA
Pollock
Crab
Rat.
Amen.
80
Rockﬁsh
Coops
Reduce capacity x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Lengthen ﬁshing season x x x x x x x x x
Increase product quality x x x x x x
Increase ex-vessel price x x x x x x x
Lower costs x x x x x x x x
Increase efﬁciency x x x x x x x x
Improve proﬁtability x x x x x x x x x x x
Improve vessel safety x x x x x x x x x x x
Maintain diverse ﬂeet/small vessels x x x x x x x x x x
Share  consolidation x x x x x x
Community impacts x x x x x x x
New  entry/windfall proﬁts x x x x x
Effects on support sectors x x x x x
x 
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mong multiple programs across regions. These commonalities
ere determined by reviewing the Fishery Management Plan (FMP)
ocuments prepared the ﬁrst time each catch share program was
mplemented. For each program, the identiﬁed purpose and need,
oals, objectives and impacts were tabulated and commonalities
cross programs were grouped into categories or themes. While
ll catch share programs emphasize biological objectives such as
aintaining healthy stocks, rebuilding depleted stocks, and reduc-
ng discards, in this paper we focus on the economic and social
onsiderations in the design of 16 U.S. federal catch share programs.
hese themes are identiﬁed in Table 2.
The themes noted in Table 2 are not necessarily common to all
rograms, do not fall into mutually exclusive categories and are
ot hierarchically ordered. Rather, the themes reﬂect the differ-
ng problems that Councils sought to address through catch share
anagement and the myriad tradeoffs that are inevitably con-
ronted in shaping design speciﬁcations. In a general sense, the
hemes noted in Table 2 fall into two broad categories: economic
ffects and distributional impacts. It is from these categories that
erformance indicators were selected where measurement was
nﬂuenced by the availability of data common to all programs. All
f the indicators were compiled for the catch share programs for
he baseline period (the average of the three years prior to program
mplementation) until 2013 except for MFP, which was estimated
hrough 2012. These indicators also only cover the harvesting sec-
ors. Therefore, for many ﬁsheries, particularly those on the West
oast and in Alaska, indicators for motherships or catcher proces-
ors are excluded. Also, all price and revenue related metrics have
een adjusted by the GDP deﬂator indexed for 2013. The speciﬁc
ndicators and their measurement follow.
.1. Economic effects
.1.1. Reduce capacity
Reducing capacity was noted as a management objective or
xpected effect in all catch share programs. Formally, capacity may
e deﬁned as the maximum amount of ﬁsh over a period of time that
an be produced by a ﬁshing ﬂeet if fully utilized, given the biomass
f the ﬁsh stock and the present state of the technology (Greboval,
003). Kirkley et al. (1999) and Kirkley and Squires (2003) outline
lternative approaches to estimate capacity output for ﬁsheries that
ould have required data that were not available for all catch share
rograms. However, conditional on technology and resource con-
itions, capacity output depends on ﬂeet size. For this reason, thex x x x
x
x x x
number of active vessels was  used as a proxy for reduction in capac-
ity, where an active vessel was  deﬁned as any vessel that takes one
or more trips on which catch share program species were landed.
2.1.2. Season length
Season length may  be adjusted for several reasons including
spawning protection, interaction with protected species, or to
reduce bycatch. Here we  focus on the length of the season over
which a species may  be landed. Prior to implementation of catch
shares, several ﬁsheries experienced early closures of ﬁshing sea-
sons due to reaching or exceeding target species and/or bycatch
quotas. In most cases, extension of the ﬁshing season was not
necessarily an explicit goal or objective for the program. Instead,
extension of the ﬁshing season was seen as an ancillary outcome to
economic effects such as improved prices or product quality or to
improved vessel safety. In this study, we  deﬁned the season length
as the total number of days in a year or deﬁned ﬁshing season in
which the ﬁshery was not closed to landing catch share species.
However, in Alaska, we used the season length index, which is
deﬁned as the ratio between active ﬁshing days and the regulatory
season length. For the Alaska programs, the season length index
accounts for catch share programs with multiple stocks that are
spatially distributed with different regulated season lengths as well
limitations on ﬁshing activity due to weather or participation in
other ﬁsheries.
2.1.3. Increased price
Improvements in ex-vessel price or product quality, or both,
were noted as expected economic effects of catch share programs,
particularly for catch share programs where an extended season
length was an anticipated outcome. Ex-vessel prices were expected
to be higher through the dual effects of alleviation of market gluts
and improved product quality due to better handling of harvested
ﬁsh as well as changes in product form at the processor level. In
this study, we  use ex-vessel price as an indicator of catch share
program performance. However, since data were not available in
all regions to measure change in product quality, it is not possi-
ble to disentangle supply effects associated with reduced market
gluts from demand effects due to improved product quality. Note
that changes in quotas as well as changes in international prices
or prices for market substitutes further complicate attribution of
changes in ex-vessel prices to catch shares.
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Table  3
The number of active vessels by catch share program.
Catch Share Program Baseline period Year 1 Average years 1–3 Average years 1–5 Last 5 year average 2013
Red Snapper 482 319 308 333 353 360
Grouper-Tileﬁsh 631 480 468 458 430
General Category Scallop 271 158 151 138
Multispecies Sectors 417 295 290 231
Surfclam 137 128 87 73 38 40
Ocean Quahog 67 57 82 76 32 27
Golden Tileﬁsh 14 11 10 10
Paciﬁc  Sableﬁsh 135 101 97 90 93 91
Shoreside Non-whiting 115 94 90 86
Shoreside Whiting 36 26 25 24
Alaska  Halibut 3432 2060 2485 2196 1033 937
Alaska  Sableﬁsh 1101 581 742 640 341 320
AFA  Pollock 114 117 107 102 87 85
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.1.4. Catch share trip revenue
Proﬁtability was expected to improve in nearly all of the catch
hare programs through a combination of improved prices and
ost savings. Although several catch share programs implemented
andatory cost data collection to be used for tracking program per-
ormance, cost data were not available for all catch share programs
o it was not possible to develop a measure of proﬁtability for each
atch share ﬁshery. Even for programs that implemented a cost
ata collection program there are substantive differences among
egions and programs in terms of what data are collected that con-
ound development of a comparable estimate of proﬁtability across
rograms. In this study, we use total revenue from catch share
pecies coupled with revenue per active vessel as a proxy indi-
ator of change in proﬁtability. That is, improvements in revenue
er vessel will be related to proﬁtability to the extent that reduc-
ions in ﬂeet size represent cost savings (either capital or operating
xpenses).
.1.5. Multi-Factor productivity change
Productivity is the relationship between outputs and inputs, and
roductivity change is a deconstruction of proﬁtability change into
ts price and quantity components (O’Donnell et al., 2008). As such,
roductivity change, more speciﬁcally MFP  change, captures mul-
iple dimensions of economic change associated with catch shares
hat were identiﬁed by Councils, (changes in product value and
ix, costs and efﬁciency), in a single metric. In a recently com-
leted study of MFP  change, NOAA Fisheries’ economists used a
owe index adjusted for biomass change to estimate MFP  change
or the catch share ﬁsheries included herein (Walden et al., 2014).
e use these estimates of MFP  change in this paper. For a detailed
reatment of methods and data see Walden et al. (2014).
.2. Distributive effects
It was recognized by the Councils that some consolidation
f the ﬂeet was inevitable even though most catch share pro-
rams sought to reduce or control capacity (see for example
mendment 16 to the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Man-
gement Plan, available at: http://www.nefmc.org/management-
lans/detail/northeast-multispecies). Consolidation was noted as
eading to beneﬁcial effects such as cost reductions and efﬁciency
ains, but concerns over potential adverse effects of excessive con-
olidation were also noted. These potential effects included the loss
f small vessels as well as a loss of diversity in terms of ﬂeet struc-
ure and landing ports, which are coincidental to issues related to
mpacts on shoreside infrastructure and community impacts.126 78 75
38.3 41.8 52
21 20 18
Although one or more of these distributive effects of consolida-
tion was noted in the majority of catch share programs, available
data are lacking to develop indicators for effects such as community
impacts or ﬂeet diversity across all programs. Instead we  use the
number of entities holding share and the Gini coefﬁcient as mea-
sures of consolidation that may  serve as proxies for the distribution
effects that could not be measured. We  also note which catch share
programs have implemented an excessive share limit, which places
a limit on allowable consolidation.
2.2.1. Entities holding share
The number of entities holding share was deﬁned as the num-
ber of unique owners or ownership groups receiving a share of the
quota at a point in time. For catch share programs that included
an excessive share limit, the number of entities was  based on how
ownership was  deﬁned in the catch share program for purposes of
monitoring the share cap. Since most programs allow shares to be
traded during the year, the number of entities holding share was
measured either at the beginning or the end of the year to provide
a consistent year-to-year indicator of share consolidation.
2.2.2. Gini coefﬁcient
We  use the Gini coefﬁcient to measure changes in the distribu-
tion of the use of quota in terms of catch share revenue among active
vessels. The Gini coefﬁcient is a measure of the difference between
the cumulative distribution of catch share revenue and the cumu-
lative distribution of the uniform distribution. Since revenue data
were available for all active vessels in each catch share program,
the Gini coefﬁcient for a census can be calculated as follows:
G =
∑
(2 × i − n − 1) x1
n2u
,
where i = 1 to n; i is the vessel’s rank order in ascending order; x is
the annual catch share species revenue for vessel i; n is the number
of active vessels; u is the mean revenue (Bellú and Liberati, 2006).
A Gini coefﬁcient of 0 means that catch share revenues are the
same for all active vessels, and a value approaching 1 means that
catch share revenues are highly concentrated in a single or among a
small number of vessels. The absolute value of the Gini coefﬁcient
is not of interest here, but rather how it is changing over time is
of interest. A decreasing Gini coefﬁcient is indicative of increasing
evenness or equality in catch share revenues, whereas an increas-
ing Gini coefﬁcient indicates decreasing evenness, or its opposite
increasing inequality among participating vessels.
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Table  4
Season length for catch share programs with a shortened season length.
Catch Share Program Baseline period Year 1 Average years 1–3 Average years 1–5 Last 5 year average 2013
Red Snappera 121 365 365 365 365 365
Grouper-Tileﬁsha 124 124 365 365 365 121
Paciﬁc Sableﬁsha 8 214 214 214 214 214
Shoreside Non-whitinga 365 355 365
Shoreside Whitinga 141 200 200 200
Alaska Halibut b 0.01 0.72 0.51 0.61 0.72 0.72
Alaska Sableﬁshb 0.07 0.96 0.67 0.78 0.96 0.98
AFA  Pollockb 0.36 0.61 0.66 0.70 0.79 0.80
Crab  Rationalizationb 0.13 0.77 0.50 0.60 0.62 0.61
Rockﬁsh Cooperativesb 0.06 0.85 0.78 0.82 0.82 0.77
Amendment 80b 0.75 0.94 0.86 0.89 0.93 0.97
when
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. Results
.1. Economic effects
.1.1. Active vessels
Across all programs, the number of active vessels decreased by
n average of 24% in the ﬁrst year of the catch share program com-
ared to the baseline period (Table 3; see online supplement for
nnual data for all catch share programs). Some programs (Alaska
alibut IFQ, Alaska Sableﬁsh IFQ, Crab Rationalization, Red Snapper
FQ, General Category Scallop IFQ, Northeast Multispecies Sectors,
aciﬁc Sableﬁsh Permit Stacking and Shoreside Whiting) had large
eductions in active vessels (greater than 24%) in the ﬁrst year,
hile other programs saw no change (Amendment 80) or increases
Rockﬁsh Cooperatives and AFA Pollock Cooperatives) in the num-
er of active vessels. The number of active vessels has continued
o decrease for most catch share programs at an average rate of
.1% per year; in 2013, there were more than a third fewer active
essels across all catch share programs when compared to the base-
ine period. The Surfclam ITQ (71% reduction) and Alaska Halibut
FQ (73% reduction) programs have seen the largest reductions in
ctive vessels over the history of the programs. However, in these
nd most other programs, much of the reductions in active ves-
els occurred in the ﬁrst year, as active vessels declined through
013 by a lower average annual rate of 2.4% when compared to
he change in active vessels in the ﬁrst year In contrast to these
rends, the number of active vessels has increased in the Rockﬁsh
ooperatives Program (Table 3).
.1.2. Season length
During the baseline years, 11 of the 16 catch share programs
ere subject to closures as quotas were reached prior to the end of
he regulated length of the ﬁshing season (Table 4). These closures
esulted in season lengths ranging from extremes of 1–7% of the
urrent active ﬁshing days in the Alaska Halibut IFQ (1%), Paciﬁc
ableﬁsh Permit Stacking (4%), Alaska Rockﬁsh Cooperatives (6%)
nd Alaska Sableﬁsh IFQ (7%) to longer seasons of 75% of active
shing days in the Amendment 80 Cooperatives program and 85%
310 days) in the Golden Tileﬁsh IFQ program. Many other ﬁsheries
xperienced shortened seasons in the baseline periods. The sea-
on length averaged one-third of the allowable season in both the
ed Snapper and the Grouper-Tileﬁsh IFQ programs, which cur-
ently operate on a year round basis. Similarly, the season length
ndex for the Crab Rationalization and AFA Pollock Cooperatives
rograms were 37% and 36% of the current season length index,
espectively. In the ﬁrst year of full catch share implementation, the
eason length expanded signiﬁcantly in the 11 programs that pre-
iously had shortened seasons. For example, the Paciﬁc Sableﬁsh
ermit Stacking season went from 8 days to 214 days; the full length
f the regulated season and has remained at 214 days in every year the ﬁshery is open to landing catch share species.
 ﬁshing days and the regulatory season length.
since implementation. Similarly, the season length index went from
0.01 to 0.72 in the Alaska Halibut IFQ and increased from 0.07 to
0.96 in the Alaska Sableﬁsh IFQ programs. In these two ﬁsheries and
nearly every other, the season length remained at levels similar to
that of year 1 in all subsequent years through 2013 (Table 4).
There were seven catch share programs that remained open dur-
ing the full length of the regulatory season both before and after
catch shares were implemented. However, with the exception of
the General Category Scallop IFQ that had no quota assigned to the
ﬁshery during the baseline period, a number of regulations were
needed in the other seven ﬁsheries that were designed to spread
landings throughout the year. These measures included, but were
not limited to trip limits, limits on effort, area closures and gear
restrictions (Table 4).
3.1.3. Prices
Across all programs, average ex-vessel prices for all of the catch
share program species increased by an average of 19% in the ﬁrst
year of the catch share program when compared to the respec-
tive baseline periods (Table 5). A few catch share programs saw
decreases in average ex-vessel prices in the ﬁrst year; ex-vessel
prices decreased by 22%, 17% and 9% in the Ocean Quahog ITQ,
Amendment 80 Cooperatives and Surfclam ITQ programs, respec-
tively (Table 5). Among these three programs, average prices were
lower than the baseline period in all but three of the 24 years for
Surfclam ITQ and were lower in all but two  of six years for Amend-
ment 80 catch share species. Ocean quahog prices were below the
baseline period in all but one year from 1990 to 1999, but have been
above the baseline period in all but one year since 2000 (Table 5).
For the 13 programs where prices improved during year 1, the
increase in average price ranged from 3% in the Grouper-Tileﬁsh
IFQ to a high of 70% in the Crab Rationalization programs (Table 5).
The average catch share species prices in 2013 were also above
each program’s baseline period in 12 of these 13 programs. In 2013,
average prices were lower than the baseline period in Northeast
Multispecies Sectors. However, average prices were greater than
the baseline period in each year from 2010 to 2012 (Table 5).
In programs where average prices improved in the ﬁrst year, the
average price remained above the baseline period in all subsequent
years through 2013 in nine catch share programs and was  above
the baseline period in all but one year in each of the other four
catch share programs including Northeast Multispecies Sectors as
noted above. For example, average sableﬁsh prices were above the
baseline period in 11 of the 12 years of the Paciﬁc Sableﬁsh Permit
Stacking program (Table 5).3.1.4. Catch share trip revenue
Compared to the baseline periods for each respective catch share
program, total catch share species revenue declined in six pro-
grams and increased in 10 programs during the ﬁrst year (Table 6).
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Table  5
Average price for catch share program species.
Catch Share Program Baseline period Year 1 Average years 1–3 Average years 1–5 Last 5 year average 2013
Red Snapper ($/lb) 3.48 3.88 3.89 3.78 3.86 4.30
Grouper-Tileﬁsh ($/lb) 3.32 3.41 3.42 3.50 3.73
General Category Scallop ($/lb) 7.04 9.25 10.12 12.19
Multispecies Sectors ($/lb) 1.26 1.30 1.31 1.20
Surfclam ($/bushel) 13.85 12.66 12.51 12.42 12.40 11.72
Ocean Quahog ($/bushel) 6.37 4.98 5.74 5.79 7.27 7.34
Golden Tileﬁsh ($/lb) 2.70 2.70 2.90 3.18
Paciﬁc Sableﬁsh ($/lb) 1.94 2.20 2.17 2.21 3.11 2.41
Shoreside Non-whiting ($/lb) 0.60 0.85 0.74 0.66
Shoreside Whiting ($/lb) 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.12
Alaska Halibut ($/lb) 1.91 2.95 2.68 2.58 5.05 4.86
Alaska Sableﬁsh ($/lb) 1.97 2.91 2.60 2.64 3.81 2.78
AFA  Pollock ($/mt) 245.01 283.03 279.24 283.28 365.40 296.22
Crab  Rationalization ($/mt) 3389.05 5750.53 4935.13 5308.08 6805.53 6555.49
Rockﬁsh Cooperatives ($/mt) 459.08 559.72 551.37 563.71 589.76 598.33
Amendment 80 ($/mt) 1220.98 1011.92 1061.33 1091.00 1083.98 932.21
Table 6
Catch share revenue (million $) for each catch share program.
Catch Share Program Baseline period
(million$)
Year 1
(million$)
Average years
1–3 (million$)
Average years
1–5 (million$)
Last 5 year
average
(million$)
2013 (million$)
Red Snapper 13.96 11.12 9.51 10.26 13.37 21.11
Grouper-Tileﬁsh 22.77 15.12 20.91 22.06 25.50
Scallop  28.37 21.14 27.70 29.45
Multispecies Sectors 86.31 86.02 83.46 57.24
Surfclam 39.63 39.83 35.82 35.66 29.09 28.78
Ocean  Quahog 29.41 23.54 26.48 26.76 24.19 23.88
Golden  Tileﬁsh 4.71 5.20 5.44 5.72
Paciﬁc  Sableﬁsh 6.70 5.51 7.51 8.44 10.14 5.36
Shoreside Non-whiting 30.35 32.25 28.81 27.33
Shoreside Whiting 9.64 23.10 23.58 26.54
Alaska  Halibut 91.80 95.35 100.25 109.02 152.30 101.16
Alaska  Sableﬁsh 81.59 100.14 88.49 79.68 83.45 64.47
AFA  Pollock 127.53 143.67 163.18 184.29 198.98 195.14
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Rockﬁsh Cooperatives 3.92 4.83 4.6
Amendment 80 244.62 256.85 23
mong the 10 programs with higher ﬁrst year revenues, the change
elative to the baseline period ranged from 0.5% for the Surfclam
TQ program to a high of 140% in the Shoreside Whiting IFQ pro-
ram. In most cases where ﬁrst year revenue declined, it was  due to
ower landings as a result of reduced quotas, and while prices were
igher, they did not increase enough to offset the lower quotas. In
wo of these programs (Northeast Multispecies Sectors and Ocean
uahog IFQ), total catch share species revenue during 2013 was
lso below the baseline period, while 2013 revenues were above
he baseline period in the other four programs (Red Snapper IFQ,
rouper-Tileﬁsh IFQ, General Category Scallop IFQ and Crab Ratio-
alization). However, there also were four catch share programs in
hich ﬁrst year catch share species revenues were greater than the
aseline periods, but were lower than the baseline period in 2013.
hese programs include Surfclam ITQ, Shoreside Non-whiting IFQ,
aciﬁc Sableﬁsh Permit Stacking and Amendment 80 Cooperatives
Table 6).
With the exception of Grouper-Tileﬁsh IFQ and Ocean Quahog
TQ, catch share species revenue per vessel improved in the ﬁrst
ear of all other catch share programs (Table 7). In the Grouper-
ileﬁsh IFQ, revenue per vessel was higher than the baseline period
n 2013 and was above the baseline period in all other years after
ear 1. Similarly, revenue per active vessel in the Ocean Quahog
shery was higher than the baseline period during 2013 and with
he exception of 2005 has been above the baseline period in every
ear from 2001 to 2013.
Among the 14 catch share programs where catch share species
evenue per vessel was above the baseline period in the ﬁrst year,174.92 224.70 190.03
4.89 5.67 5.83
252.47 258.03 220.40
revenue per vessel was  also above the baseline period during 2013
in all programs but the Rockﬁsh Cooperatives (Table 7). The latter
was one of the few programs where the number of active vessels
had increased relative to the baseline period. Although aggregate
catch share species revenue was  above the baseline period, the
number of active vessels increased proportionally more than rev-
enue resulting in lower revenue per vessel. In the remaining 13
programs where 2013 catch share species revenue per vessel was
above that for the baseline period, revenue per vessel was  more
than twice that of the baseline period in eight programs and was
above baseline period levels in every year in all programs but
the Red Snapper IFQ and Amendment 80 Cooperatives Programs
(Table 7).
3.1.5. Multi-factor productivity change
Data limitations on input quantities used by catcher vessels in
ﬁve Alaskan catch share programs (Halibut IFQ, Sableﬁsh IFQ, AFA
Pollock Cooperatives, Amendment 80 Cooperatives and Rockﬁsh
Cooperatives) as well as the Sableﬁsh Permit Stacking program
meant that the baseline period was  a single year instead of the
three-year average pre-catch share baseline period used for the
other ﬁsheries and for the other metrics. Since MFP  change was
measured using a Lowe index, the results are interpreted as the
percent change in each year relative to the baseline period. For
example, the Lowe index value of 1.19 in 2012 for the Red Snap-
per IFQ Program means that MFP  was 19% higher in 2012 than it
was during the pre-IFQ baseline period (Table 8). Of the ten catch
share programs that included a pre-catch share baseline period,
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Table  7
Catch share revenue (thousand $) per active vessel for each catch share program.
Catch Share Program Baseline period
(thousand$)
Year 1
(thousand$)
Average years
1–3 (thousand$)
Average years
1–5 (thousand$)
Last 5 year
average
(thousand$)
2013 (thousand$)
Red Snapper 28.96 34.84 30.85 30.78 37.66 58.63
Grouper-Tileﬁsh 36.09 31.50 44.88 48.48 59.30
Scallop  206.99 291.60 287.56 247.78
Multispecies Sectors 104.67 133.83 185.28 213.42
Surfclam 289.23 311.15 445.71 549.82 770.41 719.41
Ocean  Quahog 438.91 413.03 333.84 361.28 768.83 884.44
Golden  Tileﬁsh 336.26 472.77 532.58 572.48
Paciﬁc  Sableﬁsh 206.99 291.60 287.56 247.78
Shoreside Non-whiting 263.87 343.11 319.77 317.79
Shoreside Whiting 267.67 888.35 957.65 1105.74
Alaska  Halibut 26.75 46.28 43.65 53.57 146.44 107.96
Alaska  Sableﬁsh 74.11 172.37 133.37 134.13 244.28 201.47
AFA  Pollock 1118.69 1227.97 1559.94 1847.33 2286.97 2295.75
Crab  Rationalization 661.77 1420.23 1189.31 1676.60 2878.54 2533.79
Rockﬁsh Cooperatives 115.36 127.09 131.71 129.13 136.50 112.13
Amendment 80 11118.99 11675.06 11050.88 12064.22 13205.34 12244.25
Table 8
Multi-factor productivity (MFP) trends for each catch share program.
Catch Share Program Baseline period Year 1 Average years 1–3 Average years 1–5 Last 5 year average 2012
Red Snappera 1.00 1.04 1.12 1.11 1.14 1.19
Grouper-Tileﬁsha 1.00 1.07 1.14 1.14 1.19
General Category Scallops 1.00 1.21 1.44 1.44 1.57
Multispecies Sectors 1.00 1.24 1.16 1.16 0.97
Surfclam 1.00 1.34 1.50 1.64 2.28 2.14
Ocean  Quahog 1.00 0.92 0.96 0.97 1.74 1.82
Golden Tileﬁsh 1.00 1.56 1.70 1.70 1.75
Paciﬁc Sableﬁshb 1.00 1.26 1.68 2.32
Shoreside Non-whiting 1.00 1.32 1.31 1.29
Shoreside Whiting 1.00 1.02 0.83 0.64
Alaska Halibutc 0.98 0.88
Alaska Sableﬁshd 0.90 0.88
AFA  Pollockd 1.00 0.80 0.73
Crab  Rationalization 1.00 0.78 1.10 1.27 1.52 1.73
Rockﬁsh Cooperativese 1.00 0.95 1.01 1.06 1.26
a Data represent unadjusted productivity.
b Data are only available for 2003, which will be treated as the baseline. Data are also available for 2004–2010.
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FP  change was higher in 2012 in all but two programs. In each
f the eight ﬁsheries where MFP  was higher in 2012, MFP  change
as above the pre-catch share baseline periods in all years except
or the Ocean Quahog ITQ and the Crab Rationalization catch share
rograms. However, MFP  in the former has been above the baseline
eriod in every year since 1995 and in all years except year 1 (2005)
n the latter.
The two programs where MFP  was lower in 2012 include
ortheast Multispecies Sectors and Shoreside Whiting programs
Table 8). MFP  in the Northeast Multispecies Sectors program was
% lower during 2012 than it was during the baseline period
fter having been 24% and 26% higher during 2010 and 2011,
espectively. In the case of the Shoreside Whiting ﬁshery, biomass-
djusted MFP  was 36% lower in 2012 even though the ratio of
utput to inputs (unadjusted MFP) was higher than it was during
he baseline period. However, the change in biomass as measured
y the Lowe biomass index was more than twice that of the change
n unadjusted MFP, which resulted in much lower MFP  in 2012 for
his ﬁshery when adjusted for biomass.
In programs where data were not available to construct a pre-
atch share baseline period for catcher vessels, MFP  change in 2012
as above the selected baseline period in the Sableﬁsh Permit
tacking, Amendment 80 Cooperatives and the Rockﬁsh Cooper-
tives programs (Table 8). By contrast, MFP  was  either at or belowthe selected baseline period in all years for the Alaska Halibut
IFQ, Alaska Sableﬁsh IFQ and AFA Pollock Cooperatives programs
(Table 8).
3.2. Distributive effects
3.2.1. Entities holding share
Compared to the ﬁrst year of program implementation, the
number of entities holding share declined in nine of the catch share
programs evaluated (Table 9). The decline in number of entities
holding share averaged 57% in three programs (Surfclam ITQ, Ocean
Quahog ITQ and Alaska Halibut IFQ), but the rate of decline was
lower (21%) in six programs (Red Snapper IFQ, Grouper-Tileﬁsh IFQ,
General Category Scallop IFQ, Golden Tileﬁsh IFQ, Sableﬁsh Permit
Stacking and Alaska Sableﬁsh IFQ). In most of these programs, at
least 50% of the reduction in entities holding share occurred within
the ﬁrst two  to ﬁve years of program implementation.
The number of entities holding share increased after the ﬁrst
year in both the Northeast Multispecies Sectors and the Crab
Rationalization programs. The increase in entities holding share in
Northeast Multispecies Sectors program is a reﬂection of increased
participation in the program and not necessarily a reﬂection of
an increase in the dispersion of shares among more owners since
participation in this program is voluntary (Table 9).
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Table  9
The number of entities holding share in each catch share program.
Catch Share Program Baseline period Year 1 Average years 1–3 Average years 1–5 Last 5 year average 2013
Red Snapper N/A 497 470 451 418 399
Grouper-Tileﬁsh N/A 743 702 678 604
General Category Scallop 700 321 289 262
Multispecies Sectors 1401 762 813 851
Surfclam N/A 154 129 122 60 64
Ocean Quahog N/A 117 94 84 42 41
Golden Tileﬁsh 30 15 13.3 12
Paciﬁc  Sableﬁsh 154 144 139 135 116 111
Shoreside Non-whiting N/A 128 128 128
Shoreside Whiting N/A 78 78 78
Alaska  Halibut 4829 4829 4731 4484 2766 2570
Alaska  Sableﬁsh 1004 982 952 778 772
AFA  Pollock N/A 111 111 109 106
Crab  Rationalization 491 491 489 483 494 501
Rockﬁsh Cooperatives N/A 44 45 45 46 46
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/A = Not applicable.
There were ﬁve catch share programs in which the number of
ntities holding shares has remained constant or nearly constant. In
oth the Shoreside Whiting and Non-whiting IFQ ﬁsheries, transfer
f quota share was not allowed during the ﬁrst three years of the
rogram. The number of entities holding share may  be expected to
hange once permanent trades are allowed. For the remaining three
rograms, the number of entities holding share has been constant at
7 entities in the Amendment 80 Cooperatives; has increased by 2
ntities from 44 in year 1 to 46 in 2013 in the Rockﬁsh Cooperatives
Table 9).
.2.2. Gini coefﬁcient
The Gini coefﬁcient was  used to evaluate the equality of rev-
nue distribution among active vessels in each catch share program.
ompared to the baseline period, the Gini coefﬁcient increased by
n average of 12% during the ﬁrst year of program implementation
n nine programs but declined in three (Table 10). For the older
atch share programs, when we compare the average Gini coefﬁ-
ient for the ﬁrst ﬁve years with the most recent ﬁve-year average,
e ﬁnd that most of the change in the Gini coefﬁcient occurred
arly in the history of these longer term programs and that the dif-
erences between the ﬁrst and most recent ﬁve-year average Gini
oefﬁcient are modest.
When we compare the Gini coefﬁcient for 2013 to the baseline
eriod, we ﬁnd that the Gini coefﬁcient decreased in eight of the
ixteen catch share programs (Table 10). This means that for these
ight programs catch share revenue was more evenly distributed
mong active vessels during 2013 than it was during the baseline
eriod. Among the eight remaining catch share programs where
013 revenues were more concentrated compared to the baseline
eriod, there were four ﬁsheries (Grouper-Tileﬁsh IFQ, Northeast
ultispecies Sectors, Paciﬁc Sableﬁsh Permit Stacking and Alaska
alibut IFQ) in which the largest change in the Gini coefﬁcient
ccurred during year 1. In these four ﬁsheries, the Gini coefﬁcient
as relatively stable afterward (Table 10).
.2.3. Excessive share caps
Most of the catch share programs had regulations in place to
imit the accumulation of excessive shares. Excessive quota share
aps are designed to prevent individual shareholders (or entities)
rom controlling harvesting or processing as well as achieving
anagement objectives. The share cap in place for each catchhare program is listed in Table 11. Excessive share caps are in
lace for all catch share programs except Surfclam ITQ, Ocean
uahog ITQ and Northeast Multispecies Sectors (Table 11). At
he time that the Surfclam and Ocean Quahog Programs were27 27 27
established, the Reauthorized Magnuson Stevens Act (MSA, 2007)
was not in place and therefore establishing accumulation limits
were not required. The Mid-Atlantic Council has considered an
Amendment to the FMP  to address accumulation limits in the sur-
fclam and ocean quahog ITQ programs but did not take action
(Walden, 2011). Accumulation limits are not required for North-
east Multispecies Sectors due to the speciﬁc legal framework that
established this program (Amendment 16 to the Northeast Multi-
species Fishery Management Plan, available at: http://www.nefmc.
org/management-plans/detail/northeast-multispecies). However,
the New England Fishery Management Council recently submitted
Amendment 18 to the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Manage-
ment Plan that would establish share accumulation limits as well
as a limit on the total number of permits that could be owned by
any one individual (Draft Amendment 18 to the Northeast Multi-
species Fishery Management Plan, available at: http://www.nefmc.
org/library/amendment-18-information).
4. Discussion
The results presented above reveal a number of trends regarding
the economic and distributive effects of catch share management.
The majority of the objectives to improve the economic per-
formance of catch share ﬁsheries were achieved. However, the
distributional effects of catch share programs may  indicate that
consolidation is occurring in many ﬁsheries.
Economic effects from catch share ﬁsheries have generally
improved. Capacity reduction was  an objective for all of the catch
share programs, and this objective (as measured by the proxy,
number of active vessels) was  achieved for all but one catch share
program. Catch share revenue was greater in 2013 than the base-
line period for 9 of the 16 catch share ﬁsheries. In the most recent
year, catch share revenue per vessel was  above the baseline periods
in almost all catch share ﬁsheries.
Nine programs had explicit objectives to lengthen the ﬁshing
season and this was achieved for 11 catch share programs. A longer
season was not necessarily the end goal for this objective. Rather, it
is an outcome that would facilitate other economic improvements,
such as increased prices or product quality and improved safety at
sea. As many of these ﬁsheries were open for longer periods of time,
average ex-vessel prices also increased (Tables 4 and 5). For exam-
ple, as the Paciﬁc Sableﬁsh Permit Stacking program was open for
196 more days during the year, ex-vessel prices increased by 13%
(Tables 4 and 5). All of the ﬁsheries in Alaska were subject to short
season lengths prior to introduction of the catch share programs.
Perhaps the most dramatic increase in season length occurred in
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Table  10
The Gini coefﬁcient for each catch share program.
Catch Share Program Baseline period Year 1 Average years 1–3 Average years 1–5 Last 5 year average 2013
Red Snapper 0.81 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.79
Grouper-Tileﬁsh 0.83 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.89
General Category Scallopa Not available 0.55 0.49 0.45
Multispecies Sectors 0.55 0.63 0.63 0.65
Surfclam 0.32 0.37 0.45 0.46 0.49 0.50
Ocean Quahog 0.51 0.48 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.59
Golden Tileﬁsh 0.61 0.51 0.49 0.52
Paciﬁc Sableﬁsh 0.39 0.45 0.46 0.44 0.47 0.49
Shoreside Non-whiting 0.35 0.39 0.43 0.47
Shoreside Whiting 0.39 0.24 0.24 0.19
Alaska Halibut 0.59 0.66 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.64
Alaska Sableﬁsh 0.62 0.68 0.65 0.65 0.58 0.56
AFA  Pollockb Not available Not available Not available 0.37 0.36 0.35
Crab  Rationalization 0.37 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.31 0.31
Rockﬁsh Cooperatives 0.45 0.51 0.51 0.55 0.58 0.65
Amendment 80 0.25 0.22 0.25 0.24 0.21 0.15
a Data are not available for the baseline period.
b Data are only available for 20013–2013.
Table 11
Catch share program and harvesting share cap for program species, if applicable0.
Name Harvesting Share Cap
Surfclam & Ocean Quahog ITQ Not Applicable
Alaska Halibut & Sableﬁsh IFQ 0.5%, 1.5%
AFA Pollock Cooperatives 17.5%
Paciﬁc Sableﬁsh Permit Stacking No more than three permits on one vessel
Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (BSAI) Crab
Rationalization
1–20% of initial harvester quota share, 2–20% for crew quota share
Red  Snapper IFQ 6.0203% of quota share. No cap on quota pounds
Central Gulf of Alaska Rockﬁsh
Cooperatives
4-60% of quota share depending on sector
Amendment 80 Non-Pollock Trawl
Catcher/Processor Groundﬁsh
Cooperatives
30% of quota share for an individual and 20% of quota share for a vessel
Golden Tileﬁsh IFQ 49% of quota shares
General Category Atlantic Sea Scallop IFQ 2.5% for any one vessel. If an entity owns more than vessel, the entity cannot hold more than 5% of the allocation
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Grouper-Tileﬁsh IFQ 2-14% depending on speci
Paciﬁc Groundﬁsh Trawl Rationalization 2.5–17.7% depending on sp
he Alaska Halibut IFQ program, where ﬁshing occurred for as few
s four days in the baseline period (season length index = 0.01) and
ent to near full utilization of the ﬁshing year (average season
ength index for 2009–2013 = 0.72; Table 4). In the last ﬁve years,
x-vessel prices were 165% greater (average $4.80) than the base-
ine period ($1.81; Table 5). Once the catch share programs were
mplemented, there was little variation in the season length, with
he exception of Halibut IFQ, Crab Rationalization and AFA Pollock
here there were some ﬂuctuations in the season length index in
he early years of the catch share programs (Tables 4 and 5).
It is important to note that there is not a strict linear relationship
etween a longer ﬁshing season and increased prices. Fluctuations
n supply, i.e., changes in landings will affect demand for ﬁshery
roducts and as a result, ex-vessel prices may  change. Furthermore,
ome ﬁsheries that did not experience ﬁshery closures needed
ther regulatory instruments to ensure that the season is spread
hroughout the year. For example, quarterly limits on the num-
er of trips that could be taken by each vessel were utilized in the
urfclam ITQ so that ﬁshing occurred year-round.
The performance measures used to track the distributional
ffects of catch share programs illustrate a trend that bears further
crutiny. The number of entities holding share and Gini coefﬁcients,
roxies for consolidation, indicate that consolidation is occurring
n many ﬁsheries. However, the Gini coefﬁcient results indicate
hat some level of consolidation may  have been occurring before
atch share management tools were implemented in certain ﬁsh-
ries (e.g., Red Snapper IFQ, Grouper-Tileﬁsh IFQ, or Northeast, but ownership cap of 10%
Multispecies Sectors). To further examine the possible extent of
consolidation to date, we compared the current number of entities
holding share to the minimum number of entities that could exist
based on accumulation limits (Table 12).
The minimum number of entities that would be present is equal
to the inverse of the share limit. For example, the share limit for the
General Category Scallop IFQ is 2.5%, which means that the mini-
mum  number of entities would be 40. For programs that included
at least one aggregate accumulation limit as reported in Table 11,
the associated minimum number of entities that would exist if the
accumulation limit were reached is shown in Table 12. Note that
programs not shown in Table 12 had ownership caps for multi-
ple stocks or stock components, or were associated with limits on
ownership for speciﬁed components of the ﬁshery. In these cases,
it was  not possible to attribute ownership in 2013 to these sub-
components. The minimum possible number of entities ranged
from 3 (49% ownership cap) in the Golden Tileﬁsh IFQ to 200 enti-
ties (0.05% ownership cap) in the Alaskan Halibut IFQ program. The
actual number of entities during 2013 was  4 times and 12.9 times
the minimum in the Golden Tileﬁsh IFQ and Alaska Halibut IFQ pro-
grams, respectively. In 2013, the Paciﬁc Sableﬁsh Permit stacking
was the closest to being at the minimum as the 111 entities was
twice the minimum possible number of 55. The next closest was
the Shoreside Non-whiting program, which was 3.4 times more
than the minimum. The number of entities in the Red Snapper IFQ
was furthest away from the minimum as the 399 entities in 2013
were 23.5 times larger than the minimum possible of 17 (Table 12).
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Table  12
Number of entities in 2013 compared to the minimum possible number of entities in catch share programs.
Catch Share Program Minimum Number of Entities Entities in 2013 Multiples Above Minimum for 2013
Red Snapper 17 399 23.5
General Category Scallop 20 262 13.1
Golden Tileﬁsh 3 12 4.0
Paciﬁc  Sableﬁsh 55 111 2.0
Shoreside Non-whiting 38 128 3.4
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Alaska  Halibut 200 
Alaska  Sableﬁsh IFQ 67 
Our results provide further support to many others’ ﬁndings
hat catch share programs achieve economic efﬁciency but with
hese efﬁciencies there may  be increased consolidation (Bromley,
009; Hannesson, 2013; Macinko, 2014; Olson, 2011). As the
umber of catch share programs increase, Councils and stake-
olders may  need to adopt novel regulations that can balance
he need for capacity reduction while avoiding excessive con-
olidation. For example, when the Paciﬁc Trawl Rationalization
rogram was implemented there was a moratorium on quota trad-
ng within the ﬁrst three years of the program to avoid early changes
n quota holdings (50 CFR §  660.140(b)(3)(ii)(B)(2), available
t http://www.westcoast.ﬁsheries.noaa.gov/publications/ﬁshery
anagement/groundﬁsh/regulations.pdf).
. Conclusion
We  developed a set of indicators to measure the performance
f 16 catch share ﬁsheries implemented in the United States. Data
imitations mean that some of these indicators serve as proxies for
everal outcomes that could not be directly quantiﬁed. Our focus is
n evaluating program performance in terms of the objectives and
nticipated outcomes as stated by regional Fishery Management
ouncils. Within this context, we ﬁnd that many of the expectations
or economic performance of catch shares have been met. Capac-
ty as measured by reductions in active vessels has been reduced.
rices have improved, a result that is particularly pronounced for
sheries subject to early closures. Average revenue per vessel has
ncreased in the majority of catch share programs, as has MFP.
eason length has been restored in ﬁsheries that were subject to
erbies as well as ﬁsheries where effort controls were required
o spread out landings. For these reasons, catch shares seem to
e an effective tool to increase the economic performance of ﬁsh-
ries, however, there are distributional consequences related to this
anagement tool.
While not unanticipated, consolidation seems to be an issue for
sheries managed with catch shares, although there may  be an
mportant distinction to be made between accumulation of own-
rship share and the use of quota. Although the minimum number
f entities that may  be possible ranges from 3 to 200 depending on
he share limit, the actual number of entities for the programs that
ould be evaluated is signiﬁcantly larger than the theoretical min-
mum. By contrast, the Gini coefﬁcient, which we  use to measure
he use of quota, has been increasing in most catch share programs.
s previously noted, the increase in the Gini coefﬁcient has not
een large and there were no cases in which the Gini coefﬁcient
tarted out low then became relatively high. Our ﬁndings indicate
hat accumulation of ownership share may  be less of a concern than
onsolidation in the use of quota, which would include the use of
uota owned by entities as well as any quota leased from other
hare owners. Thus, to the extent that consolidation is considered
 management problem, it may  be more effective to consider caps
n the use of quota than by imposing more restrictive ownership
aps.78 7.8
2570 12.9
845 12.6
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